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Abstract 
After a brief introduction to causal proba­
bilistic networks and the HUG IN approach, 
the problem of conflicting data is discussed. 
A measure of conflict is defined, and it 
is used in the medical diagnostic system 
MUNIN. Finally it is discussed how to dis­
tinguish between conflicting data and a rare 
case. 
1 Introduction 
It has for many years been widely recognized that 
causal probabilistic networks (CPN's), have many 
virtues with respect to expert systems mainly due 
to the transparency of the knowledge embedded 
and their ability to unify almost all domain knowl­
edge relevant for an expert system (Pearl 1988). 
However, the calculation of revised probability dis­
tributions after the arrival of new evidence was 
quacy of the model and the reliability of data used. 
Therefore, no expert will blindly accept what the 
system comes up with. At least there will be kept 
a critical eye on the data, and mainly one will 
look for conflicts in the data or conflicts with the 
model. 
In this paper we present a way of building such 
a critical eye into a system with a CPN model. 
Our suggestion requires an easy way of calculating 
probabilities for specific configurations. We start 
with a brief introduction to the HUGIN approach. 
In section 3 we discuss CPN's and data conflict. 
In section 4 a measure of conflict is defined, and 
it is shown that this measure is easy to calculate 
in HUGIN and that it supports a decomposition 
of global conflict into local conflicts .. Section 5 
reports on experience with a large CPN, and in 
section 6 we discuss how to distinguish between 
conflicts in data and data originating from a rare 
case. 
Causal probabilistic Networks 
and the HUGIN approach 
for a long period intractable and therefore an ob- 2 
stacle for pursuing these virtues. Theoretical de­
velopments in the 80ies have overcome this diffi­
culty (Kim and Pearl1983, Lauritzen and Spiegel­
halter 1988, Schachter 1988, Cooper 1984, Shafer 
and Shenoy 1989). The Lauritzen and Spiegel­
halter method has been further developed to the 
HUGIN approach (Andersen et al. 1987, Jensen 
A causal probabilistic network (CPN) is con­
structed over a universe, consisting of a set of 
nodes each node having a finite set of states. The 
nodes are called variables. The universe is or­
ganized as a directed acyclic graph. The set of 
parents of A is denoted by pa( A). To each vari­
able is attached a conditional probability table for 
P(Ajpa(A)) . 
et al. 1990a, Jensen et al. 1990b ) . With the 
HUGIN approach efficient methods have been im­
plemented for calculation of revised probability 
distributions for variables in a CPN without di­
rected cycles (Andersen et a.l. 1989). 
As always when modelling real world domains, 
the results infered from the model rely on the ade-
Let V be a set of variables. The space of V is the 
Cartesian product of the state sets of the elements 
in V and is denoted by Sp(V). The probabilitie 
tables are considered as functions and they are de-
noted by greek letters </> and 1/J. If A is a variable, 
then ¢>A= P(A!pa(A)) maps Sp(pa(A)U{A}) into 
the unit interval [0, 1]. It is convenient to consider 
functions which are not normalized and take arbi­
trary non-negative values. So in the sequel, <P and 
1/J denote such functions. 
Evidence can by entered to a CPN in the form 
of findings. Usually a finding is a statement, that 
a certain variable is in a particular state. 
After evidence has been entered to the CPN one 
should update the probabilities for the variables in 
the CPN. It would be preferable to have a local 
method sending messages to neighbours in the net­
work. However, such methods do not exist when 
there are multiple paths in the network. 
The HUGIN approach which is an extension of 
the work of Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter ( 1988) 
(Jensen et al 1990a; Jensen et al 1990 b) repre­
sents one way of achieving a local propagation 
method also for CPN's with multiple paths. This 
is done by constructing a so-called junction tree 
which represents the same joint probability distri­
bution as the CPN. 
The nodes in a junction tree are sets of variables 
rather than single variables. Each node V has a 
belief table <Pv : Sp(V) - Ro attached to it. The 
pair ( V, <Pv) is called a belief universe. 
The crucial property of junction trees is that 
for any pair ( U, V) of nodes, all nodes on the path 
between U and V contain U n V. 
A belief table is a (non-normalized) assessment 
of joint probabilities for a node. If S C V, then an 
(non-normalized) assessment of joint probabilities 
for Sp(S) can be obtained from <Pv by marginal­
ization: <Ps = E V\S <Pv 
• 
Evidence can be transmitted between belief uni­
verses through the absorption operation: ( U, <Pu) 
absorbs from (V, <Pv ), ... , (W, <Pw) by modifying 
<Pu with the functions L: V\S <Pv, . .. , LW\U <Pw. 
Actually, the new belief function <Pu is defined as 
<Pu = <P'u * :E vw <Pv * . .. * E ww <Pw LU\V </>u LU\ w <Pu 
where the product ¢> * 1/J is defined as 
(¢> * 1/J)(x) = ¢>(x),P(x) 
547 
Based on the local operation of absorption the two 
propagation operations CollectEvidence and Dis­
tributeEvidence are constructed. When Collect Ev­
idence in Vis called (from a neighbour W) then V 
calls Collect Evidence in all its neighbours (except 
W), and when they have finished their CollectEv­
idence, V absorbs from them (see figure 1). 
- Direction of �bsorption 
� Ca.ll of COLLECT EVIDENCE 
Figure 1: The calls and evidence passing in Col­
lectEvidence 
When DistributeEvidence is called in V from a 
neighbour W then V absorbs from W and calls 
DistributeEvidence in all its other neighbours. 
Having constructed a junction tree, we need not 
be as restrictive with findings as in the case of 
CPN's: 
Let V be a belief universe in the junction tree. 
A finding on V is a function 
Fv : Sp(V)- {0, 1} 
So, a finding is a statement that some configu­
rations of Sp(V) are impossible. Note that the 
product of two findings f : Sp(V) - {0, 1} and 
9 : Sp(W) - {0, 1} is a finding f * 9 : Sp(V U 
W) - { 0, 1}, and f * 9 corresponds to the conjun­
cion f 1\ g. 
Using the HUGIN approach, it is possible to en­
ter findings to the CPN (or the junction tree)1, 
update the probabilities for all variables, and to 
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achieve joint probability tables for all sets of vari­
ables which are subsets of nodes in the junction 
tree. The method has proved itself very efficient 
even for fairly large CPN's like MUNIN (see Ole­
sen et al. 1989, Andersen et al. 1989). 
The main theorem behind the method is the fol­
lowing. 
Theorem 1 
Let T be any junction tree over the universe U, 
and let <Pu be the joint probability table for U. 
(a) If CollectEvidence is evoked in any node 
V and <Pv is the resulting belief table, 
then <Pv is proportional to LU\ v <Pu. 
(b) If further, DistributeEvidence is evoked 
in V, then for any node W the result­
ing belief table <Pw is proportional to 
LU\W¢U· 
0 
Before we proceed with data conflict, we will state 
an observation proved in Jensen et al. ( 1990b), 
but first noted by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 
(1988) in their reply to the discussion. 
Theorem 2 
Let T be a junction tree with all belief tables nor­
malized, and let x, . . . , y be findings with prior 
joint probability P( x * ... * y ). Enter x, . . .  , y to 
T and activate CollectEvidence in any belief uni­
verse for V. Let <l>v be the resulting belief universe 
for V. 
Then :Z::::v <l>v = P(x * .. . * y). 0 
3 CPN's and data conflict 
A CPN represents a closed world with a finite set 
of variables and causal relations between them. 
These causal relations are not universal, but re­
flect relations under certain constraints. Take for 
example a diagnostic system which on the basis of 
blood analysis monitors pregnancy. Only diseases 
relevant for pregnant women are represented in 
the model. If the blood originates from a man, the 
constraints are not satisfied, and the case is not 
covered by the model . A similar situation appears 
if the test results are flawed (e. g. red herrings). 
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Following the tradition in probabilistic reason­
ing to take examples from California, where bur­
glary and earthquake are everyday experiences, we 
have constructed the following example: 
When Mr. Holmes is at his office he fre­
quently gets phone calls from his neigh­
bour Dr. Watson telling him that his 
burglar alarm has gone off, and Mr. 
Holmes rushing home hears on the ra­
dio that there has been an earthquake 
nearby. Knowing that earthquakes have 
a tendency to cause false alarm, he then 
has returned to his office leaving his 
neighbours with the pleasure of the noise 
from the alarm. Mr. Holmes has now in­
stalled a seismometer in his house with a 
direct line to the office. The seismometer 
has three states: 
0 for no vibrations 
1 for small vibrations (caused by 
earthquakes or passing cars.) 
2 for larger vibrations (caused by ma­
jor earthquakes or persons walking 
around in the house.) 
The CPN for this alarm system is shown 
in figure 2: 
One afternoon Dr. Watson calls again 
and tells that the alarm has gone off. Mr. 
Holmes checks the seismometer, it is in 
state 0! 
From our knowledge of the CPN, we would say 
that the two findings are in conflict. Performing 
an evidence propagation does not disclose that. 
The posterior probabilities are given in figure 3. 
Only in the rare situations of inconsistent data, an 
evidence propagation will show that something is 
wrong. The problem for Mr. Holmes is whether 
he should believe that the data originate from a 
rare case covered by the model, or he should reject 
that. 
From a CPN m_pdel's point of view there is no 
difference between a case not covered by the model 
and flawed data. So what we can hope for to pro­
vide Mr. Holmes with is a measure indicating pos­
sible conflicts in the data given the CPN. 
In MUNIN (Olesen et al. 1989) an attempt to 
incorporate conflict analysis in the CPN is made. 
Burglary: <I>B : (50, 50); Earthquake: ¢E(90, 10) 
<l>s 
B 
<I> A 
B 
Figure 2: Mr. 
mometer. 
E 
N y 
N (97, 2, 1) (1, 97, 2) 
y (1, 2, 97) (0, 3, 97) 
Seismometer 
E 
N y 
N (99, 1) (1, 99) 
y (1, 99) (0, 100) 
Alarm 
Holmes' Alarm system with seis-
<I>E,B E 
B 
N y 
N .47 .05 
y .48 0 
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This is done by introducing 'other'-states and 
'other'-variables. In the example of Mr. Holmes' 
alarm system, an 'other'-variable covering lighten­
ing, flood, baseballs breaking windows etc. could 
be introduced to represent unknown causes for the 
alarm to go off, and the Burglar variable could 
have an 'other'-state covering Mr. Holmes' mis­
tress having forgotten the code for switching off 
the burglary alarm. 
Though this approach is claimed to be fairly 
successful, it raises several problems. First of all 
there is a modelling problem. The effect of an 
'other'-statement is hard to model without know­
ing what 'other' actually stands for . What should 
the conditional probabilities be? In fact, these 
probabilities were in MUNIN constructed by feed­
ing the network with conflicting data and thereby 
tuning the tables as to make 'other' light up ap­
propriately. 
A second problem is that conflict in data is a 
global property, and the introduction of 'other'­
statements in the CPN gives only a possibility of 
evaluating evidence locally. In order to combine 
the local 'other' statements to a global one, the 
CPN has to be extended drastically. 
This leads to the third major problem, which 
is more of a technical kind. The introduction of 
'other'-statements to the CPN can cause a dra­
matic increase in the size of the junction tree. Be­
sides, the technique with 'other'-states is hard to 
use if the variables are not discrete. 
Another approach has been suggested by 
Habbena ( 1976). It consists of calculating a sur­
prise index for the set of findings. Essentially, the 
surprise index off: V --. {0, 1} is the sum of the 
probabilities of all findings on V with probabilities 
no higher than f's. 
Habbena suggests that a threshold between 1% 
and 10% should be realistic. In the seismometer 
case, the surprise index for (a, s) is 3%. However, 
the calculation of a surprise index is exponential in 
the number variables in V and must be considered 
as intractable in general. 
Figure 3: Joint probabilities for earthquake and 4 
burglary posterior to a : 'alarm = Y' and s : 'Seis­
The conflict measure conf 
mometer = 0'. Our approach to the problem is that correct find­
ings originating from a coherent case covered by 
the model should conform to certain expected pat­
terns. If x, · · ·, y are the findings, we therefore 
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should expect: 
P(x * · · · * y) > P(x) x · · · x P(y) 
Hence we define the conflict measure conf as: 
P(x) X··· X P(y) 
conf(x, · · ·, y) =log 
P( ) X*. • .  * y 
(where log is with base 2). 
This means that a positive conf( x, · · ·, y) is an in­
dicator of a possible conflict. 
For the data in section 3 we have conf( a, s) = 
4.5. 
Using theorem 2, conf(x, · · ·, y) is very easy 
to calculate in HUGIN. The prior probabilities 
P(x),···,P(y) are available before the findings 
are entered, and P( x, · · ·, y) is the ratio between 
the prior and the posterior normalizing constant 
for any belief universe. 
P(I. y.z) 
P(x. y, z. u. vl 
t 
I 
t 
y 
t t t 
l u v 
Figure 4: A junction tree with findings x, y, z, u, v 
entered. Theorem 2 provides the joint probabili­
ties indicated at nodes V, U, W' and W". 
The conflict analysis can be further refined. In 
figure 4 is shown a junction tree with findings 
x, y, z, u, v entered. If CollectEvidence is evoked 
in the node V, then the evidence flowing to V 
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consists of two sets of findings, namely {x,y,z} 
and { u, v}. Since the product of findings is also a 
finding, we can say that the two findings x * y * z 
and u * v meet in V. 
The conflict in the data meeting in V is therefore 
composed of the conflict between x * y * z and u * v 
, the conflict inside {x,y,z} and inside {u,v}. It 
is easy to show that: 
conf(x, y, z, u, v) = conf(x * y * z, u * z) 
+conf(x, y, z) + conf( u, v) 
Furthermore, as indicated at figure 4, P( x * y * z) 
and P( u * v) can be calculated as ratios between 
prior and posterior normalizing constants, and 
therefore conf( x, y, z) and conf( u, v) as well as 
conf( x * y * z, u * z) are easy to calculate. 
In general: If evidence is propagated to any belief 
universe U from neighbours V, · · ·, W originating 
from findings (v, .. · v') . . . ( w, · · ·, w') respectively, 
then 
conf(v,· · ·,v',··· , W , ···W1) = 
conf( v * · · · * v', · · · , w * · · · * w') 
+conf( v, · · ·, v') + · · · + conf( w, · · ·, w') 
All terms are in HUGIN easy to calculate by use 
of Theorem 2. 
We call conf( v, · · ·, v', · · ·, w, · · ·, w') the global 
conflict and conf( v * · · · * v', · · ·, w * · · · * w') the 
local conflict. 
The calculation of conf has been implemented 
in HUGIN to follow the calls of CollectEvidence. 
The overhead to the propagation methods m 
terms of time and space is neglectable. 
5 Example: APB-MUNIN 
The conflict measure has been tested on small 
fictions examples and on a large subnetwork of 
MUNIN, namely the network for the muscle Ab­
ductor Pollicis Brevis (APB). The network is 
shown in figure 5. 
The rightmost variables in figure 5 are finding 
variables. This means that evidence is entered at 
the right hand side of the CPN and propagates to 
the left. However, as described in section 2, the 
propagation takes place in a junction tree of belief 
universes. In the test, CollectEvidence was called 
Figure 5: The DAG in MUNIN for Medianus Ab­
ductor Pollicis Brevis. The attached numbers in­
dicate the belief universe to which the finding is 
entered (see figure 6.) 
in universe number 59, and the call propagates 
recursively down the junction tree. In figure 6 is 
shown the junction tree. (Only belief universes 
where evidence meet are shown). 
First we asked the model builder, Steen An­
dreassen, to provide us with a complete set of nor­
mal findings. They were entered, and global and 
universal conflict values were calculated. The re­
sults are shown in figure 7. Surprisingly we got 
a global conflict of 23.3 for the entire set of find­
ings and apparently the conflict can be traced to 
belief universe no. 45. Further, the evidence from 
15 and 17 looks conflicting. Returning to Steen 
Andreassen with our surprise, he recognized that 
he had given us a wrong value for the finding 
qual.mup.amp. which was entered to belief uni­
verse 15. It should have been 540 J.LV rather than 
200 pV. 
We entered the corrected finding and got a 
global conflict value -1.5 for the entire set of find­
ings with local and subglobal values ranging be­
tween 0 and -1.4. 
Then typical findings for a patient suffering 
from moderate proximal myopathy were entered. 
As can be seen in figure 8, this resulted in large 
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Figure 6: The part of the MUNIN junction tree 
for APB where evidence meet. The numbers are 
labels of belief universes. Bold numbers indicate 
entrance of findings. 
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Figure 7: The conflict measures from the first test 
example. The italiced values are local conflict val­
ues and the bold figures are the global ones. 
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negative conflict values confirming the coherence 
of the findings. 
Figure 8: Typical findings for a patient suffering 
from moderate proximal myopathy entered. 
Finally, we simulated hypothesizing. We en­
tered a set of findings originating from a healthy 
patient, and we also entered the disease state 
'moderate proximal myopathy'. The result is 
shown in figure 9. The disease finding is entered to 
belief universe 58, and it can be seen that the dis­
ease does not contradict a couple of normal find­
ings, but indeed the whole set. 
6 Conflict or rare case? 
It can happen that typical data from a very rare 
case might cause a high value of conf. In the case 
of Mr. Holmes' alarm system a flood (with proba­
bility 10-3 could be entered to the CPN explaining 
the data (see figure 10). 
For this system we get conf( a, s) = 4.5. It is 
still indicating a possible conflict. The reason is 
that though P( a, s) is possible, it is under the 
Figure 9: Findings for a healthy patient, and 
the hypothesis 'moderate proximal myopathy' en­
tered. 
Figure 10: Mr. Holmes' revised CPN. 
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rare condition of flood. Mr. Holmes looks out 
of the window. It rains cats and dogs, and he 
has resolved the problem; the model gives a new 
P(Flood) = 0.84. 
The problem above calls for more than a pos­
sibility for refined conflict analysis . We need a 
method to point out whether a conflict can be ex­
plained away through a rare cause. 
Let ( x, .. .  , y) be findings with a positive conflict 
measure, and let H be a hypothesis which could 
explain the findings: conf( x, . . . , y, H) < 0 
We have 
r( H) l P(x) x . . . x P(y) x P(H) con1' x, . . . , y, = og 
P( ) X* .. ·*Y*H 
= 
P(H) conf(x, ... , y)+ logP(HI ) x, ... ,y 
This means that if 
1 P(Hjx, .. . , y) f( og 
P( H) 
> con x, . . . , y) 
then H can explain away the conflict. 
The left-hand ratio can be monitored automat­
ically for all variables (in the flood example the 
value is 5.6). This means that there is no need 
for manually to formulate explaining hypothesis 
in terms of states of variables. More complex hy­
pothesis can also be monitored if they can be ex­
pressed as findings. 
7 Conclusion 
The measure of conflict 
conf( x, · · · , y) = log P(;� x · · · x P( Y) X* ... * y) 
has many promising properties. It is easy to cal­
culate in HUGIN, it is independent of the order in 
which findings are entered , it can be used for both 
global and local analysis of conflicts in data, and 
it has a natural interpretation which supports the 
usual mental way of inspecting data for flaws or 
for originating from sources outside the scope of 
the current investigation. 
However, still some practical and theoretical 
work is needed in order to understand the signifi­
cance of specific positive conflict values. Also, the 
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detailed conflict analysis a it is nowconnected to 
the structure of the junction tree rather than to 
the CPN itself. This should be relaxed. 
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